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I. Facts and context 
The Eritrean-Ethiopian War of 1998-2000 was a tragic conflict that resulted in a widespread loss 
of life, as well as other injury and damage, for these two developing countries in the Horn of 
Africa. A unique feature of this incident is that the December 2000 Algiers agreement ending the 
conflict provided for the establishment of an Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (claims 
commission), charged with deciding claims for loss, damage or injury resulting from a violation 
of international law committed by either country. One of Ethiopia’s claims was that Eritrea 
initiated the armed conflict by an illegal use of force. Thus, the facts and legal positions 
advanced by the two sides were formally litigated before, and decided by, a five-member arbitral 
commission of arbitrators of third-country nationalities, which concluded that Eritrea’s conduct 
at the outbreak of the armed conflict constituted a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
1
1. The opening months of the conflict (May-June 1998)
On May 6-7, 1998, small-scale clashes occurred between Eritrean military and Ethiopia militia 
or police patrols in a remote area along the western part of the Eritrean-Ethiopian boundary near 
a town called Badme.
2
 As the claims commission later found, “it is clear from the evidence that
these incidents involved geographically limited clashes between small Eritrean and Ethiopian 
patrols along a remote, unmarked, and disputed border.”3 Such minor incidents might well have
1
 The following account draws heavily on the description of the conflict and the legal analysis contained in Sean D 
Murphy, Won Kidane, and Thomas R Snider, Litigating War: Arbitration of Civil Injury by the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Claims Commission (Oxford University Press 2013), especially chapters 1 and 4. The author served as counsel to 
Ethiopia in the proceedings before the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. 
2
 For conflicting factual accounts by the two countries on the clashes, see Patrick Gilkes and Martin Plaut, War in 
the Horn: The Conflict Between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Discussion Paper 82, Royal Institute of International Affairs 
1999) 21–26; Ted Dagne, ‘The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict’ (CRS Report for Congress, 6 July 2000) 2 (CRS Report 
for Congress). 
3
 Partial Award, Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8 (19 December 2005) [12]. The arbitral awards of the claims 
commission may be found at: (1) Murphy, Kidane, and Snider (n 1) annexes; (2) Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission, (2010) 26 RIAA 1; and (3) the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
<https://pcacases.com/web/view/71>. 
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gone unnoticed, but they were followed by much more serious action. On the morning of May 
12, Eritrean armed forces consisting of soldiers, tanks, and artillery attacked the town of Badme, 
crossed through the Badme plain to higher ground in the east, and attacked several other areas in 
Ethiopia’s Tahtay Adiabo Wereda, as well as places in the neighboring Laelay Adiabo Wereda.4 
The areas attacked on May 12, the claims commission later found, “were all either within 
undisputed Ethiopian territory or within territory that was peacefully administered by 
Ethiopia . . . .”5 Even during the conflict, the Organization of African Unity (OAU, the 
predecessor to the current African Union) Ministerial Committee found that Badme and its 
environs were under Ethiopian administration prior to May 1998 and hence demanded that 
Eritrea withdraw its forces from the area.
6
 Indeed, even “Eritrea accepted that the Badme area 
had been continuously under Ethiopian authority for a considerable period of time, both before 
and after independence in 1993,” but maintained that the colonial treaties concluded between 
Italy and Ethiopia established that Badme was part of Eritrea.
7
  
 
Initially, Ethiopian resistance to the invasion was minimal, mostly involving Ethiopian militia 
and police equipped solely with small arms.
8
 Ethiopia moved quickly, however, to deploy its 
military forces to the region where they took up defensive positions to prevent any further 
Eritrean advance. Consequently, by June the two armies had assumed positions along a western 
front, with Eritrea in possession of Ethiopian territory (or at least Ethiopian-administered 
territory) in Kafta Humera Wereda, Tahtay Adiabo Wereda, and Laelay Adiabo Wereda.
9
 
 
Shortly after their incursion in the west, Eritrean military forces invaded and occupied areas 
controlled by Ethiopia along the central part of the border in Mereb Lekhe Wereda by crossing 
the Mereb River at a number of places.
10
 Again, though there was some resistance by local 
Ethiopian militia and police, those individuals quickly fled along with local civilians, and there 
                                                 
4
 ibid [14]  
5
 ibid [15]. For a third-party account more contemporaneous to the events, see The Ethiopia-Eritrea War: U.S. 
Policy Options, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on Int’l Relations, 106th Cong. 35 (25 
May 1999) (statement of Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) (“A border skirmish occurred 
on May 6, 1998 at Badme. A week later, Eritrea sent troops and armor into and beyond Badme into territory 
administered by Ethiopia. After several weeks of fighting, several areas previously administered by Ethiopia . . . fell 
under Eritrean control.”). 
6
 Letter dated 24 December 1998 from the permanent representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to 
the President of the Security Council (28 December 1998) UN Doc S/1998/1223, annex [21]. 
7
 Martin Plaut, ‘The Conflict and its Aftermath’ in Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (eds), Unfinished 
Business: Ethiopia and Eritrea at War (Red Sea Press 2004) 93; see also Gilkes and Plaut (n 2) 58–59. Though 
Ethiopia administered the territory as of May 1998, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission would later agree 
with Eritrea that the evidence of Ethiopian administration of Badme and other areas was not “sufficiently clear in 
location, substantial in scope or extensive in time to displace the title of Eritrea that had crystallized as of 1935.” 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border [5.95], reprinted in (2002) 
41 ILM 1057, and available at < https://pcacases.com/web/view/99>.  
8
 Partial Award, Western and Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia’s Claims 1 & 3 (19 December 2005) [25]–[26]; see CRS 
Report for Congress (n 2) 8 (“The use of overwhelming force by Eritrea in the May 1998 attack surprised Ethiopian 
authorities, who were unprepared psychologically and militarily to contain the Eritrean advance.”). 
9
 Partial Award, Western and Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia’s Claims 1 & 3 (n 8) [26]. 
10
 Partial Award, Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim 2 (28 April 2004) [43]. 
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were no significant Ethiopian armed forces present.
11
 As on the western front, Ethiopian forces 
eventually arrived and assumed defensive positions creating a central front, but Eritrea would 
continue to occupy Mereb Lekhe Wereda for two years. In this area, Eritrean forces also invaded 
portions of the neighboring Ahferom Wereda in the same fashion, while hostilities also extended 
during May 1998 to the nearby mountainous terrain of Irob Wereda.
12
 In June 1998, Eritrean 
forces also invaded Gulomakheda Wereda on the central front, the location of an important 
border town named Zalambessa. Situated on the road from Addis Ababa to Asmara, Zalambessa 
was a major communications and transport link between the two countries, with a pre-war 
population estimated by the claims commission to be between 7,000 and 10,000.
13
 After 
overrunning Zalambessa, Eritrean forces established defensive positions to the south of the town 
and occupied other portions of the wereda, which they held for some two years.
14
 The claims 
commission would find with respect to the central front: 
 
Eritrean forces moved into areas administered prior to the conflict by Ethiopia, occupied territory, and 
established field fortifications and trench lines, sometimes permanently and sometimes only for a brief 
period before returning to adjacent territory administered prior to the conflict by Eritrea. In all cases, they 
carried out intermittent operations that extended beyond the occupied areas. These operations included 
artillery fire, intermittent ground patrols, and the placement of defensive fields of mines.
15
 
 
Along the eastern part of the border, conflict also erupted in June in Ethiopia’s Elidar Wereda, 
Dalul Wereda, and Afdera Wereda. Of particular note on this eastern front was the fighting in 
Elidar Wereda at Bure Town, which is located on the road connecting Ethiopia to the Eritrean 
port of Assab.
16
  
 
2. Ensuing two-year conflict (June 1998-May 2000) 
 
With the advent of the rainy season (mid-June to mid-September), fighting between the two 
countries largely subsided, with both sides maintaining defensive positions inside their trenches 
and Eritrean forces in control of portions of Ethiopian (or Ethiopian-administered) territory. 
Though some shelling continued, both sides focused on the deployment and position of their 
forces and increasing their armaments and aircraft.
17
 
 
                                                 
11
 ibid 
12
 ibid [54], [74] 
13
 Partial Award, Central Front, Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 (28 April 2004) [30]. 
14
 Partial Award, Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim 2 (n 10) [60]–[61], [70]; Partial Award, Central Front, Eritrea’s 
Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 (n 13) [30] (“After the armed conflict began on the Western Front in May 1998, both 
Eritrea and Ethiopia began to strengthen their armed forces along what would become the Central Front. From mid-
May to early June, Eritrean armed forces attached at a number of points, first in Ahferom and Merbe Lekhe 
Weredas, then in Irob and Gulomakheda Weredas.”). 
15
 Partial Award, Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim 2 (n 10) [24]; see also Partial Award, Central Front, Eritrea’s 
Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 (n 13) [30] (using identical language). 
16
 Partial Award, Western and Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia’s Claims 1 & 3 (n 8) [59]–[60]. 
17
 Plaut (n 7) 95–96; CRS Report for Congress (n 2) 7 (“Both Ethiopia and Eritrea purchased sophisticated weapon 
systems, including fighter planes from Russia, Ukraine and eastern Europe.”). 
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In February 1999, Ethiopia initiated on the western front a counter-offensive known as 
“Operation Sunset,” in which it regained “control over virtually all of the territory that Eritrea 
had occupied [there] for the preceding nine months.”18 Because Ethiopia used fighter planes and 
helicopters in support of the operation, Eritrea and other countries criticized Ethiopia for 
breaking a ban on airstrikes.
19
 For several months thereafter, Eritrea repeatedly sought to retake 
Badme, but failed to do so, including during a major effort in June 1999.  
 
In March 1999, extensive fighting broke out on the central front, at Zalambessa, but Eritrea 
continued to hold the town and adjacent areas. Sporadic fighting continued there and also 
occurred on the eastern front, but neither side gained a decisive advantage by the time the rainy 
season returned in June 1999. In general, the war during this period on the central and eastern 
fronts was a series of “set piece” engagements, involving exchanges of small amounts of 
territory, but with considerable loss of life and damage to property.
20
 
 
3. Ethiopian incursion into Eritrea (May-June 2000) 
 
On May 12, 2000, Ethiopia launched a major offensive from the area of Badme, followed 
thereafter by a thrust at Zalambessa on the central front. Ethiopian forces in the west outflanked 
and broke through the Eritrean lines and then penetrated into Eritrean territory, seizing several 
Eritrean towns (Barentu, Bimbina, Bishuka, Mailem, Molki, Shambuko, and Tokombia).
21
 From 
there, some Ethiopian forces moved east in Eritrea toward Mai Dima and Mendefera, others 
traveled west toward Alighidir, Gogne, Haykota, and Teseney, while still others returned to 
Ethiopia.
22
 Of particular importance, Ethiopian troops were within striking distance of Adi 
Quala, which lay only about 100 kilometers by a good road from the Eritrean capital of 
Asmara.
23
 Ethiopian troops that reached Teseney were engaged by Eritrean troops and retreated 
south back to Ethiopia through Omhajer and Guluj, and then over the Setit River.
24
 After being 
reinforced, those forces returned to Eritrea and recaptured Alighidir, Guluj, and Teseney on June 
12-14.
25
  
 
After its initial success in the west, Ethiopia turned its attention to the central front, launching a 
major offensive on May 23 during which it recaptured Zalambessa and captured the Eritrean 
border town of Tserona, pushed Eritrean forces out of Ethiopia, and then advanced into Eritrean 
                                                 
18
 Partial Award, Western and Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia’s Claims 1 & 3 (n 8) [27]; Plaut (n 7) 96–97. 
19
 See, e.g., CRS Report for Congress (n 2) 4. 
20
 Plaut (n 7) 104; Partial Award, Central Front, Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 (n 13) [32]. 
21
 Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 
& 26 (19 December 2005) [22]; Partial Award, Central Front, Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 (n 13) [33]; see also 
CRS Report for Congress (n 2) 9. 
22
 Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 
& 26 (n 21) [22]–[23]. 
23
 Plaut (n 7) 106. 
24
 Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 
& 26 (n 21) [23]. 
25
 ibid [24] 
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territory, capturing the town of Senafe and large parts of the Tserona and Senafe Sub-Zobas.
26
 
After seizing high positions north of Senafe, Ethiopian forces stopped, and both sides assumed 
defensive positions along a new front, this time inside Eritrea. For a few days, Ethiopian forces 
entered Eritrea’s Areza, Mai Mene, and Adi Quala Sub-Zobas.27 
 
4. Diplomatic efforts to end the conflict 
 
In parallel with these military operations, considerable diplomatic efforts were made to end the 
war. When the fighting first broke out in May 1998, the United States and Rwanda joined 
together as mediators, sending representatives to both Asmara and Addis Ababa in an effort to 
resolve the conflict. After meeting with the two countries, the mediators proposed in early June 
that a cease-fire be adopted based on certain steps: (1) agreement by both sides to pursue 
resolution of any disagreements through pacific means; (2) redeployment of Eritrean forces from 
Badme to positions held before May 6, 1998, and the return of the prior administrative officials 
to Badme, along with the deployment there of an international observer mission; (3) an 
investigation into the events of May 6; (4) agreement to delimitation and demarcation of the 
border; and (5) demilitarization of the border.
28
  
 
Though Ethiopia accepted the proposal, and though these same elements would ultimately 
become the heart of a final peace agreement nineteen months later, early in the war they were not 
acceptable to Eritrea, principally because of the requirement to withdraw from the disputed 
territory, such as Badme, that had been seized.
29
 The OAU Council of Ministers urged the parties 
to accept and implement the proposal,
30
 while the UN Security Council commended the effort, 
condemned the use of force in the conflict (without indicating which side had acted wrongfully), 
and called upon both parties to cease hostilities.
31
 As the conflict dragged along, the US-Rwanda 
early proposals were incorporated in late 1998 by the OAU into a proposed framework 
agreement,
32
 a step again accepted by Ethiopia
33
 and supported by the Security Council,
34
 but not 
                                                 
26
 Plaut (n 7) 106–07; Partial Award, Central Front, Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 (n 13) [34]. 
27
 Partial Award, Central Front, Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 (n 13) [45], [49], and [53].  
28
 See US Press Statement on the US-Rwanda Peace Plan, June 3, 1998, reprinted in Tekeste Negash and Kjetil 
Tronvoll, Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War (2000) 120; Mohammed O Maundi, I 
William Zartman, Gilbert M Khadiagala, and Kwaku Nuamah, Getting In: Mediators’ Entry Into the Settlement of 
African Conflicts (United States Institute of Peace Press 2006) 157–59. 
29
 Plaut (n 7) 92–93; Gilkes and Plaut (n 2) 58. 
30
 See Letter dated 8 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations Addressed 
to the Secretary-General (9 June 1998) UN Doc S/1998/485. 
31
 UNSC Res 1177 (26 June 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1177, 2. 
32
 OAU High-Level Delegation: Proposals for a Framework Agreement for a Peaceful Settlement of the Dispute 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia (7-8 November 1998), reprinted in UN Doc S/1998/1223 (n 6) annex [33], and in 
Negash and Tronvoll (n 28) 122; see Maundi et al. (n 28) 160–64; Edoardo Greppi, ‘The 2000 Algiers Agreements’ 
in Andrea de Guttry, Harry HG Post, and Gabriella Venturini (eds), The 1998-2000 War between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia: An International Legal Perspective (TMC Asser Press 2009) 55-57. 
33
 UNSC Res 1226 (29 January 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1226 [4]. 
34
 ibid [1], [3]; UNSC Res 1227 (10 February 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1227 [4]–[5]. 
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by Eritrea.
35
 
 
After Ethiopia’s breakthrough on the western front in February 1999, Eritrean President Isaias 
Afwerki informed the Security Council that Eritrea formally accepted the framework 
agreement.
36
 Since Eritrea continued to hold portions of Ethiopian territory (such as 
Zalambessa), however, Ethiopia charged that Eritrea did not really accept the framework 
agreement, and the hostilities continued.
37
 Further efforts at diplomacy by various countries, the 
OAU, the European Union, and the United Nations, including efforts to clarify in greater detail 
the modalities and arrangements for implementing the framework agreement,
38
 failed to bring 
the parties to a cease-fire.
39
 
 
When Ethiopia launched its counter-offensive in May 2000, the Security Council condemned the 
renewal of hostilities
40
 and then declared an arms embargo on both countries.
41
 Intense 
diplomacy was again pursued to end the conflict, but now Ethiopia had the upper hand in the 
fighting and was content to push Eritrean forces out of Ethiopia, to try to destroy Eritrea’s 
fighting capacity, and to gain the advantage by seizing Eritrean territory along the border.
42
 
Eritrea’s army, however, remained intact, and after lines solidified between the armies on the 
Eritrean side of the border, Ethiopia declared on June 1 that the war was finished, and on June 18 
both countries agreed to a cease-fire.  
 
5. Cessation of hostilities (June 2000) and peace agreement (December 2000) 
 
From May 29 to June 10, 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia participated in “proximity talks” under the 
auspices of the OAU in Algiers. On June 18, the countries signed a cessation of hostilities 
agreement, by which they committed themselves to a cease-fire and Ethiopia agreed to the 
redeployment of its forces back to areas under Ethiopian administration prior to May 1998.
43
 In 
                                                 
35
 UNGA ‘Africa’ (1998) UNYB 146–47. Eritrea did seek clarifications regarding the framework agreement, to 
which the OAU responded. Negash and Tronvoll (n 28) 125, 128. 
36
 Plaut (n 7) 98; Statement by the President of the Security Council (27 February 1999) UN Doc S/PRST/1999/9 
(“The Security Council welcomes the acceptance by Eritrea at the Head of State level of the OAU Framework 
Agreement and recalls the prior acceptance of the Agreement by Ethiopia.”); Press Statement of 2 March 1999 from 
the Eritrean Foreign Ministry Accepting the OAU Framework Agreement and Explaining the Continuation of the 
War, reprinted in Negash and Tronvoll (n 28) 133. 
37
 Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Response of 10 March 1999 to Eritrea’s Acceptance of the OAU 
Framework Agreement, reprinted in Negash and Tronvoll (n 28) 135; Plaut (n 7) 98–99, 102. 
38
 Modalities for Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement on the Settlement of the Dispute between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, July 12, 1999, reprinted in Negash and Tronvoll (n 28) 142; Technical Arrangements for 
Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement and its Modalities, reprinted in ibid 143. 
39
 Plaut (n 7) 99, 101–03; Gilkes and Plaut (n 2) 57–60. 
40
 UNSC Res 1297 (12 May 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1297 [1]. 
41
 UNSC Res 1298 (17 May 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1298 [6]. 
42
 Plaut (n 7) 106–07. 
43
 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Eri.-Eth. (adopted 18 June 2000) 2138 UNTS 86 [1], [9]; see Maundi et al. 
(n 28) 164–71; Greppi (n 32) 57–59. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, there “are no accurate 
figures of casualties, but many observers say that an estimated 50,000-100,000 were killed in the two-year old war.” 
CRS Report for Congress (n 2) 7. 
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addition, they agreed to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force of some 4,200 troops—later 
called the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)—within a twenty-five kilometer-wide 
zone just inside Eritrea along the Eritrean-Ethiopian border as it existed prior to May 1998.
44
 
Further, Eritrean forces would remain outside this “temporary security zone,” though Eritrean 
police and local militia could return.
45
 
 
While the Security Council authorized the establishment and deployment of UNMEE,
46
 talks 
continued for the purpose of reaching a final peace agreement. Those talks culminated in the 
signing of a final agreement, sometimes referred to as the Algiers agreement, by Eritrea and 
Ethiopia on December 12, 2000.
47
 In it, the parties agreed to a permanent termination of military 
hostilities and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other.
48
 Further, the parties 
agreed, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to repatriate all 
prisoners of war.
49
  
  
Articles 3-5 of the Algiers agreement identified three institutional structures that would assist the 
parties in their post-war cooperation. First, the agreement provided for an investigation to be 
carried out with respect to the incidents leading up to and including May 6, 1998, which “could 
have contributed to a misunderstanding between the parties regarding their common border, 
including the incidents of July and August 1997.”50 The investigation would be carried out by an 
independent body appointed by the OAU Secretary-General, in consultation with the UN 
Secretary-General, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, and would result in a report being communicated to the 
OAU and the two countries. This investigation, however, never occurred. Second, the agreement 
called for the creation of a Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (boundary commission), 
consisting of five arbitrators of third-country nationality, charged with delimiting and 
demarcating the border.
51
 The boundary commission received pleadings from the parties and in 
2002 issued its delimitation decision.
52
 Third, the agreement provided for the establishment of 
                                                 
44
 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities (n 43) [2]–[3], [12]; UNSC Res 1312 (31 July 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1312 
[1] (authorizing UNMEE); UNSC Res 1320 (15 September 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1320 [2] (authorizing up to 4,200 
troops); see Andrea de Guttry, ‘The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)’ in The 1998-2000 War between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia (n 32) 79; Giovanni Cellamare, ‘Caratteri della missione delle Nazioni Unite in Etiopia ed 
Eritrea (UNMEE)’ [‘Nature of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)’], in Studi di diritto 
internazionale in onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz [Studies of International Law in Honor of Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz] 
vol 3 (Editoriale Scientifica 2004) 1571. 
45
 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities (n 43) [11]–[12]. 
46
 UNSC Res 1312 (n 44); UNSC Res 1320 (n 44). 
47
 Agreement, Eri.-Eth. (adopted 12 December 2000) 2138 UNTS 94, 40 ILM 260; see Greppi (n 32) 59–62. 
Representatives from Algeria, the European Union, the Organization of African States, and the United States, along 
with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, signed the agreement as witnesses. 
48
 Agreement (n 47) art 1. 
49
 ibid art 2 
50
 ibid art 3 
51
 ibid art 4 
52
 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border (n 7); see also Special 
Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea (15 December 2006) UN Doc S/2006/992, enclosure, 
Statement by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, List of Boundary Points and Coordinates, annex, reprinted 
in (2007) 46 ILM 155, 158–59. 
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the claims commission charged with deciding claims for war-related injuries.
53
  
 
II. The positions of the main protagonists and the reactions of third States and 
international organizations 
 
1. Ethiopia’s position 
 
Ethiopia’s jus ad bellum claim before the claims commission asserted that, beginning on May 12, 
1998, and continuing through that month and into June, Eritrea carried out a series of 
unprovoked and unlawful armed attacks, moving its troops and heavy armor across the de facto 
boundary between the two countries. In the course of moving into Ethiopian (or Ethiopian-
administered but disputed) territory, Ethiopia charged that Eritrea attacked not just Ethiopian 
military and police units, but Ethiopian civilians as well, causing extensive death and injury 
through shelling, mine-laying, murder, rape, detention, and abduction. According to Ethiopia, the 
attack began along the western part of the border, but then unfolded over the course of the 
following days and weeks to encompass key segments of the entire 1,000-kilometer boundary 
between the two countries. The armed conflict that followed lasted for more than two years. 
 
Though much of the focus of Ethiopia’s claim was on the outbreak of the war in May and June 
1998 in the border regions, the claim was not so limited temporally or geographically. With 
respect to the temporal scope, the claim concerned not just the initial launching of the war, but 
the continuation of it from that time through to December 2000. In other words, it was Ethiopia’s 
contention that the violation continued throughout the period when Eritrea occupied territory that 
it had seized in May and June, and throughout the period when Ethiopian forces pushed Eritrea 
out of that territory and pressed into Eritrean territory for the purpose of setting up a defensive 
zone at key strategic points, pending the conclusion of a final peace agreement that protected 
Ethiopia from any further threat. As (now Judge) Christopher Greenwood has stated: 
 
The terms in which Articles 2(4) and 51 [of the UN Charter] are couched . . . have the consequence that the 
modern ius ad bellum applies not only to the act of commencing hostilities but also to each act involving 
the use of force which occurs during the course of hostilities. Any use of force, even after the outbreak of 
fighting, is prohibited if it cannot be justified by reference to the right of self-defence recognized in Article 
51 of the Charter.
54
 
 
Ethiopia’s theory, therefore, was that Eritrea engaged in numerous actions after May 1998 that 
were not strictly necessary for its own self-defense. Rather, Eritrea’s acts were efforts to preserve 
                                                 
53
 Agreement (n 47) art 5. For general assessments of the Commission, see Won Kidane, ‘Civil Liability for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The Jurisprudence of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in the 
Hague’ (2007) 25 Wis Int’l LJ 23; Pierre D’Argent and Jean d’Aspremont, ‘La Commission des Réclamations 
Erythrée-Ethiopie: Un Premier Bilan’ [‘Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission: An Initial Assessment’] (2007) 53 
Ann Fr Dr Int 347; Pierre D’Argent, ‘La Commission des Réclamations Erythrée-Ethiopie: Suite et Fin’ [‘Eritrea-
Ethiopia Claims Commission: Continuation and Conclusion’] (2009) 55 Ann Fr Dr Int 279; Michael J Matheson, 
‘The Damage Awards of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission’ (2010) 9 LPICT 1. 
54
 Christopher Greenwood, ‘The Relationship Between ius ad bellum and ius in bello’ (1983) 9 Rev Int’l Stud 221, 
222–23. 
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and protect its seizure of Ethiopian (or at least Ethiopian-administered) territory; had Eritrea 
sought solely to protect its own territory, Eritrea could have ended the conflict at any point by 
stating that it was willing to return to the territory it administered prior to May 1998. As Ethiopia 
saw it, Eritrea’s failure to do so until the summer of 2000, after Ethiopia had reclaimed all its 
territory and pressed into Eritrean territory to establish a defensive buffer, meant that Eritrea’s 
violation of the jus ad bellum continued up until that point. Loss, damage, or injury resulting 
from that continuing violation of the jus ad bellum, according to Ethiopia, was compensable 
before the claims commission.  
 
With respect to the geographic scope, Ethiopia’s contention was that Eritrea’s violation of the jus 
ad bellum consisted of not just the movement of troops across a border, but also adverse 
treatment of Ethiopian nationals and property in Eritrea, seizure of Ethiopians as prisoners of 
war, and serious harm to the Ethiopian economy. As such, while much of the loss, damage, or 
injury occurred in the border regions, other losses were suffered far from the border, in towns 
that were exposed to aerial bombardment, in prisoner of war camps, among Ethiopians living in 
Eritrea who felt they had no choice but to return to their home country, from Ethiopian property 
stranded at ports in Eritrea, and among businesses in Ethiopia whose commercial activities were 
interrupted due to the general outbreak of war. 
 
Based on what it viewed as a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, Ethiopia sought 
compensation from Eritrea for widespread loss, damage, or injury to Ethiopia resulting from the 
violation, not just in the time and place of the initial invasion, but throughout Ethiopia and 
throughout the course of the conflict. Thus, even though the jus ad bellum finding was focused 
on the initial invasion, Ethiopia maintained that the invasion sparked an armed conflict that 
inevitably and inescapably unfolded into a two-year war involving extensive losses to Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia viewed prior precedents of World War I, World War II, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
as supporting the proposition that a State that initiates a war is responsible for extensive 
compensation, though admittedly, for most conflicts there existed no authoritative decision 
maker (such as the claims commission) to determine what that compensation should be.
55
 
 
2. Eritrea’s position 
 
Eritrea’s position was focused on two prongs. The first prong was to argue that the claims 
commission had no jurisdiction over Ethiopia’s jus ad bellum claim. In that regard, Eritrea 
focused on Article 3 of the Algiers agreement, which had called for the creation of an 
“independent and impartial body” under the auspices of the OAU. It provided that 
  
[i]n order to determine the origins of the conflict, an investigation will be carried out on the incidents of 6 
May 1998 and on any other incident prior to that date which could have contributed to a misunderstanding 
between the parties regarding their common border, including the incidents of July and August 1997.
56
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Eritrea sought to argue that the existence of Article 3 demonstrated that the Algiers agreement 
did not give the claims commission any authority to pass upon a claim that required findings 
with respect to the “origins of the conflict.” That task having been allocated to another body, the 
claims commission was precluded from doing so itself. 
 
The claims commission rejected Eritrea’s argument, noting that a factual inquiry into “origins” 
and “misunderstandings” is not the same as a determination of the legal claim advanced by 
Ethiopia, which concerned whether Eritrea’s actions in May and June 1998 constituted a 
violation of the jus ad bellum.
57
 As the claims commission saw it, determining “the origins of the 
conflict and the nature of any misunderstandings about the border, had they been made by the 
impartial body anticipated by Article 3, could have been helpful in promoting reconciliation and 
border delimitation, but they certainly would not have answered the question of the legality of 
Eritrea’s resort to force.”58 The factual inquiries to be undertaken by the two bodies were not the 
same, and only the claims commission was empowered to determine whether one of the States 
violated the jus ad bellum.
59
 
  
Eritrea’s second prong was to argue that, on the merits, Eritrea’s actions at the outbreak and 
throughout the armed conflict constituted self-defense. In that regard, Eritrea advanced three 
alternative arguments. 
 
Eritrea’s first self-defense argument was “that Ethiopia was unlawfully occupying Eritrean 
territory in the area around Badme,” the area where the initial invasion occurred, and that 
therefore Eritrea was justified in defending its territory.
60
 This argument relied heavily on the 
decision reached by the boundary commission in April 2002, which delimited the boundary 
between the two countries in such a way that the town of Badme fell within the territory of 
Eritrea. As such, Eritrea’s theory was that because Eritrea was correct in May 1998 that Badme 
was a part of Eritrea, and because Ethiopia therefore was in Eritrean territory in May 1998, then 
Eritrea was justified in using military force to seize Badme and to expel any Ethiopian 
government presence. 
 
Eritrea’s second self-defense argument was that Eritrea’s conduct was a response to Ethiopian 
“incursions into Eritrea” in early May 1998.61 Eritrea and Ethiopia presented different accounts 
of what happened on May 6-7 in the area of Badme, both in terms of the numbers of persons 
involved, the location of what happened, and the nature of the incidents. 
 
                                                 
57
 Partial Award, Jus Ad Bellum (n 3) [4]. 
58
 ibid 
59
 ibid 
60
 ibid [9] 
61
 ibid 
11 
 
 
Eritrea’s third defense was that its use of force was a permissible response to a “declaration of 
war” issued by Ethiopia on May 13, 1998.62 In essence, Eritrea sought to argue that Ethiopia 
commenced the war by issuing a declaration; having established a state of war between two 
belligerents, Eritrea was permitted to use military force against Ethiopia.  
 
Each of these three arguments failed before the claims commission and are addressed below in 
discussing the commission’s decision about the legality of Eritrea’s actions. 
 
In the event that Eritrea was found responsible for a violation of Article 2(4), Eritrea maintained 
that that the “limited and careful phrasing of the Commission’s partial award” meant that 
reparation should be confined to satisfaction, in the form of the liability finding reached by the 
claims commission, which could be repeated in a final damages award.
63
 Eritrea emphasized that 
only in very limited circumstances where notorious aggression had occurred (World War I, 
World War II, and Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait) had the international community imposed an 
extensive regime of compensation upon a party to an armed conflict, and even then only after a 
broad multilateral process that had widespread international support. No such process existed in 
this case; indeed, the Security Council had not condemned Eritrea’s conduct as a breach of the 
peace but rather had approached the conflict in a much more cautious and measured fashion.
64
 
Later in the proceedings, Eritrea accepted that compensation might be paid, but maintained that 
the scope of compensation should be strictly confined to the place and time of the initial 
invasion, and even then contested various aspects of Ethiopia’s evidence in that limited sphere.65 
 
III. Legality of the operation 
 
1. Eritrea’s conduct violated UN Charter Article 2(4) 
 
After weighing the evidence placed before it, the claims commission concluded in its jus ad 
bellum partial award that Eritrea invaded Ethiopia on May 12, 1998, beginning in the area of 
Badme. The claims commission stated as follows: 
 
The evidence showed that, at about 5:30 A.M. on May 12, 1998, Eritrean armed forces, comprised of at 
least two brigades of regular soldiers, supported by tanks and artillery, attacked the town of Badme and 
several other border areas in Ethiopia’s Tahtay Adiabo Wereda, as well as at least two places in its 
neighboring Laelay Adiabo Wereda. On that day and in the days immediately following, Eritrean armed 
forces then pushed across the flat Badme plain to higher ground in the east. Although the evidence 
regarding the nature of Ethiopian armed forces in the area conflicted, the weight of the evidence indicated 
that the Ethiopian defenders were composed merely of militia and some police, who were quickly forced to 
retreat by the invading Eritrean forces.
66
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The claims commission found that Eritrea’s attack was in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter,
67
 specifically 
 
by resorting to armed force to attack and occupy Badme, then under peaceful administration by Ethiopia, as 
well as other territory in the Tahtay Adiabo and Laelay Adiabo Weredas of Ethiopia, in an attack that began 
on May 12, 1998, and is liable to compensate Ethiopia, for the damages caused by that violation of 
international law.
68
 
 
As indicated in the prior section, Ethiopia’s position was that the jus ad bellum violation 
commenced at the outbreak of the war with Eritrea’s invasion on the western front in the area of 
Badme, but continued geographically, spreading along the entire border and affecting persons 
and property even far from the border, and temporally throughout the duration of the armed 
conflict. Further, while the violation began in a particular place, Eritrea’s military actions were 
undertaken along all three fronts, and other actions (e.g., mistreatment of Ethiopian civilians in 
Eritrea) occurred away from the fronts. As such, according to Ethiopia, the jus ad bellum 
violation should not be viewed as having a narrow geographic or temporal reach limited to the 
time and place of the initial invasion. 
 
The claims commission’s findings in April 2004 with respect to Ethiopia’s central front claim 
seemed to support the idea that Eritrea’s attack on Ethiopia unfolded over a lengthy period of 
time and along a substantial part of the border. In that partial award, the claims commission 
stated: 
 
24. After the armed conflict began on the Western Front in May 1998, both Eritrea and Ethiopia began to 
strengthen their armed forces along what would become the Central Front. From mid-May to early June, 
Eritrean armed forces attacked at a number of points, first in Ahferom and Mereb Lekhe Weredas, then in 
Irob and Gulomakheda Weredas. In Gulomakheda Wereda, the significant border town of Zalambessa 
(with a pre-war population estimated at between 7,000 and 10,000) was also taken. In all four weredas, 
Eritrean forces moved into areas administered prior to the conflict by Ethiopia, occupied territory, and 
established field fortifications and trench lines, sometimes permanently and sometimes only for a brief 
period before returning to adjacent territory administered prior to the conflict by Eritrea. In all cases, they 
carried out intermittent operations that extended beyond the occupied areas. These operations included 
artillery fire, intermittent ground patrols, and the placement of defensive fields of land mines. 
  . . . . 
 
26. When Ethiopia later introduced substantial numbers of its armed forces into the four weredas, a static, 
although not fully contiguous, front was created that remained largely the same for nearly two years. 
Hostilities varied in intensity during that period and included some instances of intense combat during 
1999. However, in May of 2000, Ethiopia launched a general offensive that drove all Eritrean armed forces 
out of the territory previously administered by Ethiopia and took Ethiopian forces deep into Eritrea. 
Ethiopian armed forces remained in Eritrean territory until late February 2001, when they returned to the 
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pre-war line of administrative control pursuant to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of June 2000 and 
the Peace Agreement of December 12, 2000.
69
 
 
In the text of its jus ad bellum partial award, the claims commission stated that “once the armed 
attack in the Badme area occurred and Ethiopia decided to act in self-defense, a war resulted that 
proved impossible to restrict to the areas where that initial attack was made.”70 Yet the dispositif 
found at the end of the partial award was directed only at the early part of the war, specifically in 
the area of Badme on the western front in May 1998. There, the claims commission’s dispositif 
stated that Eritrea violated UN Charter Article 2(4) by “resorting to armed force on May 12, 
1998 and the immediately following days to attack and occupy the town of Badme, then under 
peaceful administration by the Claimant, as well as other territory in the Claimant’s Tahtay 
Adiabo and Laelay Adiabo Weredas.”71 Thus, the claims commission declined to include as a 
part of the Article 2(4) violation Eritrea’s other military actions along the border occurring 
within days of the initial invasion, including those that involved the movement of troops and 
armor across other parts of the border into Ethiopia and the seizure of Ethiopian territory, such as 
the large town of Zalambessa on the central front.  
 
In order for Ethiopia to show that such military actions were part of Eritrea’s jus ad bellum 
violation, the claims commission apparently viewed it as necessary for Ethiopia to prove that all 
these actions were “a program of pre-planned and coordinated armed attacks in multiple 
locations.”72 In the absence of proof that the military actions were “predetermined,” the claims 
commission viewed it as possible that Eritrea was simply responding to “developing military 
demands as both Parties sought to control key corridors of attack and defense after it became 
clear that Ethiopia would not acquiesce in Eritrea’s captures of territory on the Western Front.”73 
Hence, in its dispositif for the jus ad bellum claim, the claims commission found that Ethiopia’s 
“contention that subsequent attacks by [Eritrea] along other parts of their common border were 
pre-planned and coordinated unlawful uses of force fails for lack of proof.”74 
 
The claims commission analyzed the fact of the movement of Eritrean troops and armor into the 
Badme area and concluded that, in doing so, Eritrea violated the jus ad bellum. The claims 
commission did not view it as necessary to reach any finding regarding the intent of the Eritrean 
Government, such as whether the Eritrean Government believed that it was simply reclaiming its 
own territory and therefore was not violating Article 2(4). All that mattered was that Eritrean 
troops crossed the de facto boundary in the area of Badme in large numbers. The claims 
commission also did not see it as necessary to reach any findings regarding at what governmental 
level within Eritrea the decision to invade at Badme was reached, or to what extent the invasion 
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had been planned in the weeks or months before it happened. As such, the claims commission 
seems to have applied a standard of strict liability to the initial invasion, one that places little 
emphasis on the fault or intentions of Eritrea. 
 
At the same time, having determined that Eritrea’s armed attack in May 1998 on Badme and 
nearby areas was a jus ad bellum violation, the claims commission decided to limit the violation 
solely to those places and that time because it could not conclude that the aggressor’s further 
actions, occurring within days or weeks on other parts of the border, were “preplanned” or 
“predetermined.” Apparently, the claims commission’s approach with respect to events after the 
initial invasion did not entail any strict liability; instead, Eritrean preplanning had to be shown in 
order to establish that the latter conduct was part of a broad plan of aggression – that the Eritrean 
Government intended that the war expand along the border to other locations – rather than just a 
reaction to Ethiopia’s response.  
 
The claims commission’s finding that Ethiopia had not proven Eritrean preplanning for the 
central and eastern fronts is somewhat in tension with its later findings (related to damages) that 
military action on those other fronts was reasonably foreseeable to Eritrea at the time of the 
initial invasion, given the strategic and military value of seizing transportation links within 
Ethiopian territory in those areas. Apparently the claims commission regarded it as reasonably 
foreseeable to Eritrea on May 12, 1998 that armed conflict would unfold on the central and 
eastern fronts, but that nevertheless Eritrea may not have made any plans for taking action in 
those fronts, even though it in fact took such action within days after the initial invasion. Why 
the claims commission assumed a requisite level of preplanning for the initial invasion but was 
unwilling to assume such preplanning for military actions along the border to seize strategic 
points in Ethiopia in the days after the initial invasion is not clear. 
 
But is preplanning or intent required at all? The claims commission’s approach seems to very 
narrowly circumscribe the conduct that is proscribed by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, limiting 
it to the sanctioning of the act of a State in initiating a war. The Article 2(4) prohibition is not so 
narrowly crafted; instead, it broadly instructs States not to use force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, whether preplanned or not, and whether 
initiating or expanding an armed conflict. Proving the existence of a common plan to engage in 
aggression may be an important component of criminally prosecuting an individual for 
committing aggression; indeed, at Nuremberg, when judging the culpability of the defendants for 
“crimes against the peace,” the tribunal developed a count concerning the conduct of a person 
broadly engaging in a common plan to prepare, initiate, and wage aggression.
75
 Yet a different 
count allowed for conviction simply for waging a war of aggression (including for acts taken 
well into the course of the conflict, such as the waging of submarine warfare against neutral 
vessels),
76
 such that establishing the existence of a common plan is not always required even in 
the criminal context. Outside the criminal context, for an inter-State violation of the jus ad 
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bellum, it is unclear why pre-planning or intent is required at all; the simple fact of moving 
troops and armor into another State’s territory should be sufficient. 
 
A related question is whether the jus ad bellum is principally directed only towards the very first 
action of an armed conflict and the specific military objective envisaged by the aggressor State at 
that time. Once a State initiates a war in violation of the jus ad bellum to achieve that objective, 
does the jus ad bellum drop away, to be replaced instead solely by the jus in bello and other 
relevant rules? Or does the jus ad bellum have some continuing relevance for how the parties 
conduct themselves in expanding the scope and nature of the armed conflict?  
 
The better view is that any actions by the aggressor State that are taken to prevent the defending 
State from exercising its right of self-defense should be regarded as part of the jus ad bellum 
violation. The Article 2(4) prohibition is not narrowly crafted to the sanctioning of the initiation 
of a war; it precludes a State not just from using force to attack another State, but from using 
further force to prevent the other State from exercising its inherent right of self-defense to which 
it is entitled under international law. Preventing a State from defending itself, whether those 
defensive actions were anticipated or not by the aggressor, is a use of force against the territorial 
integrity and political independence of a State just as much as an initial invasion of that State.  
 
The conditions for engaging in self-defense under UN Charter Article 51, especially the 
restrictions on proportionality and necessity, are understood as operating throughout the course 
of the armed conflict; if a defending State undertakes action that is not necessary or 
proportionate, it engages in its own unlawful use of force in violation of Article 2(4).
77
 Hence, 
whatever actions an aggressor takes that serve to maintain, preserve, or extend its aggression are 
all part of the jus ad bellum violation. As such, even if Eritrea’s conduct along the other fronts 
involved entering Ethiopian territory for the purpose of controlling “key corridors of attack and 
defense” to thwart Ethiopia’s efforts at self-defense, Article 2(4) is best understood as 
prohibiting such action. 
 
A possible explanation for the claims commission’s decision to view the jus ad bellum violation 
as limited solely to Eritrea’s armed attack in May 1998 on Badme and other areas in Tahtay 
Adiabo and Laelay Adiabo Weredas might be that, as of December 2005, the claims commission 
was concerned about the ramifications of a broader jus ad bellum finding for the damages phase 
that was yet to come. If so, then the claims commission was being guided less by legal 
considerations than by practical concerns. Further, the ultimate decision it reached in August 
2009 regarding damages was not meaningfully circumscribed by the narrow jus ad bellum 
finding. Indeed, as explained further below, the claims commission awarded jus ad bellum 
compensation to Ethiopia for loss, damage, and injury suffered at Badme and nearby areas, but 
also awarded such compensation for losses suffered on the two other fronts, for losses that 
occurred quite distant from the war fronts, and for losses that occurred throughout the course of 
the war. Thus, if the purpose of the narrow jus ad bellum finding was to limit in time and place 
the scope of the damages, it did not have such an effect. 
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 2. Eritrea’s conduct was not self-defense under UN Charter Article 51 
 
As previously noted, Eritrea’s first self-defense argument was that its conduct was permissible 
self-defense given that Ethiopia was unlawfully occupying Eritrean territory in the area around 
Badme, the area where the initial invasion occurred. There were two key difficulties with 
Eritrea’s theory. First, as of May 1998 and continuing throughout the armed conflict, there was 
no international arbitral or other authoritative decision clarifying whether Badme was part of 
Eritrea or was part of Ethiopia. Each country claimed Badme as a part of its territory, but 
throughout the period of the war there was no delimitation let alone demarcation of the 
boundary. Only with the boundary commission’s April 2002 decision, almost two years after the 
cessation of hostilities, was there an authoritative international decision as to which State 
possessed sovereignty over Badme. So one problem with Eritrea’s approach was that it made the 
permissibility of conduct during the conflict (who might use force against whom, as well as who 
was the occupier of another’s territory) contingent on a legal determination that was only reached 
after the conflict was over. Such an approach is inherently undesirable, as it creates considerable 
uncertainty during an armed conflict relating to disputed territory as to how both the jus ad 
bellum and the jus in bello should be applied by the parties to the conflict 
  
Second, to the extent that peaceful administration of territory is important, the evidence before 
the claims commission strongly indicated that, as of May 1998, Badme and its environs were 
under the peaceful and effective administration of Ethiopia, not Eritrea. While Eritrea sought to 
lean on the boundary commission’s decision as relevant to the issue of effective administration 
of territory as of May 1998, that decision was not driven by proof of administration of territory. 
Instead, the focus of the boundary commission was on the proper interpretation of colonial-era 
treaties dating back some 100 years, with de facto local or regional administration playing very 
little role. As the Algiers agreement stated, the boundary commission’s task was to “delimit and 
demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) 
and applicable international law.”78 Thus, the boundary commission saw its task as determining 
the legal boundary to which Eritrea was entitled as of its independence in 1993, not the boundary 
actually operative on the ground in dividing the effective administration of the two countries as 
of that time or as of May 1998. 
 
By contrast, contemporaneous with the conflict itself, there existed important information 
regarding the effective administration of territory by the two countries as of May 1998. 
Immediately after the outbreak of the armed conflict, various countries and international 
organizations, including the United Nations and OAU, urged the two sides to withdraw their 
forces to the positions they occupied prior to May 1998. Among other things, this meant the 
“redeployment of the Eritrean forces from Badme to positions held prior to May 6, 1998.”79 In 
other words, it was generally understood that a return to the status quo would require Eritrea to 
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withdraw its forces from Badme and the surrounding area. In June 1998, the OAU Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government decided to send a high-level delegation to investigate the armed 
conflict and make recommendations for its resolution.
80
 After meeting itself with the parties, the 
OAU high-level delegation deputized a committee of ambassadors to meet with the parties and to 
conduct a fact-finding investigation into the dispute, which occurred from June 30 to July 9, 
1998.
81
 That committee found that “[w]ith regard to the authority which was administering 
Badme before 12 May 1998 and on the basis of the information at our disposal, we have reached 
the conclusion that Badme Town and its environs were administered by the Ethiopian authorities 
before 12 May 1998.”82  
 
After further investigation and review of the matter by a committee of ministers, the OAU high-
level delegation issued, in early November 1998, a statement and a set of proposals for a 
framework agreement to end the conflict. Those proposals included one stating that “the armed 
forces presently in Badme Town and its environs, should be redeployed to the positions they held 
before 6 May 1998 as a mark of goodwill and consideration for our continental Organization.”83 
The proposals for a framework agreement were endorsed at the OAU summit in December 
1998.
84
 Given that Eritrean military forces at that time occupied Badme, the OAU’s proposal 
tacitly acknowledged that Eritrean forces were not in Badme prior to May 1998. Moreover, the 
OAU high-level delegation expressly confirmed to Ethiopia that the recommendation was 
referring to the withdrawal of Eritrea from Badme and its environs, which were administered by 
Ethiopia prior to May 1998.
85
 The European Union endorsed the proposals,
86
 as did the Security 
Council, which specifically urged Eritrea to accept them.
87
  
 
Likewise, an agreement crafted in July 1999 in the wake of diplomacy by various countries, the 
OAU, the European Union, and the United Nations tried to establish certain “modalities” for 
ending the conflict, including that the “Eritrean Government commits itself to redeploy its forces 
outside the territories they occupied after 6 May 1998.”88 Again, the tacit understanding was that 
in May 1998 Eritrea moved its forces into certain territory, the most well-known of which was 
Badme, and would have to depart from that territory in order for the conflict to end. 
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During the course of the conflict, as previously noted, Ethiopia successfully expelled Eritrean 
forces from Badme and its environs in February 1999. A further counter-offensive in May 2000 
pushed all Eritrean forces out of Ethiopian territory and allowed Ethiopia to press into Eritrean 
territory.
89
 At that point, requiring that Ethiopian forces redeploy so as to leave Eritrean territory 
and return to territory possessed by Ethiopia prior to May 1998 became essential to ending the 
conflict. Thus, the cessation of hostilities agreement, concluded by the two countries in June 
2000, established a scheme by which Ethiopian forces would redeploy to territory that Ethiopia 
controlled prior to May 1998, pursuant to plans submitted to and agreed upon by UNMEE.
90
 
Specifically, the cessation of hostilities agreement in paragraph 9 stated that “Ethiopia shall 
submit redeployment plans for its troops from positions taken after 6 February 1999, and which 
were not under Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998, to the Peacekeeping Mission. This 
redeployment shall be completed within two weeks after the deployment of the Peacekeeping 
Mission and verified by it.”91 
 
To fulfill its mandate, UNMEE had to establish the line behind which Ethiopian forces must 
redeploy and then monitor whether the redeployment had occurred. In drawing that line, 
UNMEE had to determine which areas were and were not under “Ethiopian administration” as of 
May 1998. The “UNMEE line” as it became known was therefore an important on-the-ground 
determination by a third-party during the course of the conflict as to which territory was 
administered by whom at the outbreak of conflict. 
 
In light of this background, the claims commission saw the UNMEE line as most relevant in 
considering both jus ad bellum and jus in bello violations. Use of the UNMEE line first occurred 
in the context of applying the jus in bello to claims arising in the central front;
92
 to the extent that 
certain violations of the jus in bello only occurred in “occupied territory,” it was necessary to 
determine whether a belligerent had seized and “occupied” territory of the opposing belligerent. 
Rather than rely on the boundary commission’s 2002 determination decision (based largely on 
colonial-era treaties), the claims commission relied on the UNMEE line established at the end of 
the conflict (based on the United Nations’ best understanding of what territory the two 
belligerents possessed at the outbreak of the conflict). The claims commission stated in its 
central front partial award: 
 
For the purposes of its assigned tasks, the Claims Commission concludes that the best available evidence of 
the areas effectively administered by Ethiopia in early May 1998 is the agreement on the areas to which 
Ethiopian armed forces were to be re-deployed, as set forth in paragraph 9 of the Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement of June 18, 2000.
93
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That use of the UNMEE line for purposes of the jus in bello in the central front proceeding was 
then used again for purposes of the jus ad bellum.
94
 
 
Badme and its environs, as well as the other territories seized by Eritrea in May and June 1998, 
were on the Ethiopian side of the UNMEE line. When Ethiopian forces redeployed to those 
areas, including Badme, after the cessation of hostilities, UNMEE regarded Ethiopia as being in 
compliance with Ethiopia’s obligation to redeploy to the territory it possessed at the outbreak of 
the war. As such, the claims commission found that the areas “initially invaded by Eritrean 
forces [on May 12, 1998] were all either within undisputed Ethiopian territory or within territory 
that was peacefully administered by Ethiopia and that later would be on the Ethiopian side of the 
line to which Ethiopian armed forces were obligated to withdraw in 2000” under the cessation of 
hostilities agreement.
95
 
 
Though it used the UNMEE line for the purpose of applying the jus in bello and jus ad bellum, 
the claims commission was careful to assert that doing so had no effect on the lawful boundary 
between the two countries as determined by the boundary commission.
96
 Rather, the claims 
commission was simply fulfilling its task of applying the relevant laws of war to an armed 
conflict in a time frame where the legal boundary had not yet been delimited or demarcated. In 
the context of applying the jus in bello for the central front claims, the claims commission said 
that it 
 
considers that, under customary international humanitarian law, damage unlawfully caused by one Party to 
an international armed conflict to persons or property within the territory that was peacefully administered 
by the other Party to that conflict prior to the outbreak of the conflict is damage for which the Party causing 
the damage should be responsible, and that such responsibility is not affected by where the boundary 
between them may subsequently be determined to be.
97
 
 
Thus, the key question with respect to Eritrea’s first self-defense argument was whether a 
country (such as Eritrea) that believes it has a valid claim to territory that is peacefully occupied 
by another country (such as Ethiopia) may use military force to seize the territory. While Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter is not specific to the issue, the UN General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration 
on Friendly Relations helps clarify the meaning of Article 2(4) by providing: “Every State has 
the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing international boundaries 
                                                 
94
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of another State or as a means of solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and 
problems concerning frontiers of States.”98 Reflecting on the matter, Oscar Schachter argued: 
 
In view of the considerable number of territorial disputes in the world at present, the claim that Article 2(4) 
does not apply to the use of force to recover territory by the rightful owner would, if sustained, go a long 
way toward reducing the scope of the prohibition against force. . . . Underlying this interpretation is a 
general awareness among governments that an exception for recovering “illegally occupied” territory 
would render Article 2(4) nugatory in a large and important group of cases involving threats of force.
99
 
 
Citing to the 1970 Declaration, to Schachter, and to other authorities, the claims commission 
rejected Eritrea’s first defense, noting that “the practice of States and the writings of eminent 
publicists show that self-defense cannot be invoked to settle territorial disputes.”100 Echoing 
Schachter’s conclusion, the claims commission noted that “border disputes between States are so 
frequent that any exception to the prohibition of the threat or use of force for territory that is 
allegedly occupied unlawfully would create a large and dangerous hole in a fundamental rule of 
international law.”101 
 
Embedded within this conclusion appears to be an important temporal point. Eritrea could not 
use force to seize disputed territory it regarded as illegally occupied by Ethiopia, when Ethiopia 
had administered that territory for many years. By contrast, Ethiopia could use force to reclaim 
territory it regarded as illegally occupied by Eritrea, so long as it did so shortly after Eritrea 
seized the territory by force. In other words, the fact that a State has successfully used force to 
occupy disputed territory does not preclude defensive action by another State that had been 
peacefully administering the territory, so long as the action is undertaken immediately or as soon 
as diplomatic efforts are exhausted. Article 2(4) only precludes a State from using force to seize 
control of disputed territory that has been peacefully administered by another State for a long 
period of time. 
 
Eritrea’s second self-defense argument was that Eritrea’s conduct was lawful in response to 
Ethiopian “incursions into Eritrea” in early May 1998.102 Eritrea and Ethiopia presented different 
accounts of what happened on May 6-7 in the area of Badme, both in terms of the numbers of 
persons involved, the location of what happened, and the nature of the incidents. Ultimately, the 
claims commission found it unnecessary to resolve the conflicting factual accounts because it 
viewed the matter, even on Eritrea’s account, as not rising to the level that would justify Eritrean 
armed force in self-defense. 
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The claims commission began its analysis by noting that resort to the use of armed force is only 
permissible if authorized by the UN Security Council or when exercised in self-defense in 
accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
103
 As there was no Security Council authorization 
for Eritrea to use armed force, Eritrea’s argument had to rely on self-defense as set forth in 
Article 51, which recognizes an inherent right to self-defense against an “armed attack,” and 
contemplates a State acting in self-defense reporting to the Security Council that it is doing so.
104
  
 
The claims commission did not regard whatever Ethiopia may have done on May 6-7 as 
constituting an “armed attack” against Eritrea. According to the claims commission, “[l]ocalized 
border encounters between small infantry units, even those involving the loss of life, do not 
constitute an armed attack for purposes of the Charter.”105 On either Eritrea’s or Ethiopia’s 
account of what happened in early May, the claims commission saw these incidents as involving 
 
geographically limited clashes between small Eritrean and Ethiopian patrols along a remote, unmarked, and 
disputed border. The Commission is satisfied that these relatively minor incidents were not of a magnitude 
to constitute an armed attack by either State against the other within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.
106
 
 
Moreover, the claims commission appears to have regarded Eritrea’s failure to report to the UN 
Security Council that it was acting in self-defense as a form of evidence that Eritrea, in early 
May 1998, did not regard itself as the object of an armed attack necessitating the exercise of a 
right of self-defense.
107
 A further element that appears to have influenced the claims 
commission’s reasoning was the existence of a bilateral process for resolving border problems, 
which was functioning at the ministerial level in early May 1998. Eritrea and Ethiopia had set up 
a joint body to discuss border problems, which was meeting in Addis Ababa on May 8, 1998. 
While the claims commission did not expressly draw any conclusion from the existence of that 
process, the claims commission did note its existence and further noted that the Eritrean 
delegation left Addis Ababa on the night of May 8.
108
 The implication of the claims 
commission’s observations might be that it regarded Eritrea as having a meaningful avenue for 
raising whatever concerns it might have had about the May 6-7 incident, and that Eritrea’s failure 
to pursue fully that avenue called into question that its actions on May 12 were truly in response 
thereto. 
 
Having concluded that Eritrea was not the object of an “armed attack” by Ethiopia, the claims 
commission found that Eritrea had no basis for resorting to self-defense against Ethiopia. Even 
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had the May 6-7 incidents been regarded as an “armed attack,” it seems likely that Eritrea would 
have had difficulty in establishing that the extensive deployment of military armor and personnel 
across the border was a necessary or proportionate response to the May 6-7 incidents. The claims 
commission, however, had no need to reach that issue. 
 
Eritrea’s third and final argument relating to self-defense was that its use of force was a 
permissible response to a “declaration of war” issued by Ethiopia on May 13, 1998.109 One 
obvious problem with this defense was the timing; Eritrean military forces crossed into Ethiopia 
on May 12, a full day before Ethiopia’s alleged “declaration of war.” The claims commission, 
however, focused on the terms of the declaration – which was issued by the Ethiopian Council of 
Ministers and Parliament – and noted that the declaration did not, in fact, “declare war” on 
Eritrea or declare there to be a state of war as between the two countries.
110
 Rather, the resolution 
condemned Eritrea’s May 12 invasion, stated that Ethiopia would not accept Eritrea’s ensuing 
seizure of territory, and asserted that Ethiopia would act in self-defense until such time as 
Eritrea’s forces either withdrew from or were forced out of that territory. The claims commission 
saw this as a standard assertion of a right of self-defense by Ethiopia, not a casus belli for 
Eritrea. The nature of the declaration as an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense was 
consistent with the fact that Ethiopia reported to the UN Security Council that it was taking 
defensive action, as permitted under the terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter.
111
 
 
 3. Eritrea was obligated to pay compensation to Ethiopia 
 
In its final award on damages for Ethiopia, the claims commission applied a proximate-cause 
standard in which it determined “what injury was proximately caused by Eritrea’s delict, 
informed by judgments regarding the consequences that should have been reasonably foreseeable 
to Eritrea’s military and civilian leaders at the time of its unlawful action.”112 The commission 
concluded that reasonable foreseeability did not limit the damages solely to the time and place of 
the initial invasion.
113
 At the same time, the commission was of the opinion that it was not 
reasonably foreseeable to Eritrea that its invasion would lead to all of the types of injury for 
which Ethiopia was now claiming compensation.
114
 Instead, the commission advanced a more 
“nuanced” view, saying that 
 
it agrees that the test of foreseeability should extend to a broader range of outcomes than might need to be 
considered in a less momentous situation. A substantial resort to force is a serious and hazardous matter. A 
party considering this course is bound to consider matters carefully, weighing the costs and possible bad 
outcomes, as well as the outcome it seeks. This is particularly so given the uncertainties of armed conflict. 
At the same time, if a party is deemed to foresee too wide a range of possible results of its action, reaching 
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too far into the future, or too far from the battlefield, foreseeability loses meaning as a tool to assess 
proximate cause. If all results are foreseeable, the test is meaningless.
115
 
 
The claims commission then applied its test to the three fronts along the Eritrea-Ethiopia border, 
for different categories of alleged loss, damage, or injury. In doing so, the commission indicated 
several factors that it considered in setting its levels of compensation. First, the commission did 
not take into account a desire to deter future violations of the jus ad bellum when setting levels of 
compensation; rather, the commission’s role was simply to apply the law of state responsibility 
to the claim before it.
116
 Second, the commission did not aspire to establish a precise 
quantification of each type of harm suffered, because doing so was far too difficult given the 
scale of injury at issue. Rather, the commission pursued its “best assessment, drawing upon a 
variety of indicators,” which “frequently involved rough approximations.”117 Third, the 
commission regarded injury resulting solely from a jus ad bellum violation as meriting a lower 
level of compensation than a comparable injury resulting from a violation of the jus in bello. The 
commission regarded the latter as inherently more grave
118
 and expressed concern that failing to 
distinguish between the two might undercut incentives for an aggressor State to comply with the 
jus in bello.
119
 Fourth, the commission regarded Eritrea’s violation of the jus ad bellum as 
“different in magnitude and character from the aggressive uses of force marking the onset of the 
Second World War, the invasion of South Korea in 1950, or Iraq’s 1990 invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait.”120 As such, Ethiopia was apparently entitled to lesser amounts of compensation than 
the victim States of those other conflicts. Finally, the commission factored into its quantum of 
damages a concern “that the financial burden imposed on Eritrea . . . not be so excessive, given 
Eritrea’s economic condition and its capacity to pay, as seriously to damage Eritrea’s ability to 
meet its people’s basic needs.”121 
 
 All told, the claims commission awarded to Ethiopia $87,260,520 million in 
compensation for Eritrea’s violation of the jus ad bellum.122 As of 2016, such compensation has 
not yet been paid. 
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IV. Conclusion:  precedential value 
 
The claims commission’s jus ad bellum findings are of considerable precedential value. The 
commission considered and addressed several important and complicated issues concerning law 
on the resort to force, self-defense, and reparation. Rarely have such claims been litigated and 
rarer still have decisions been issued on these matters. There are various aspects of the claims 
commission’s findings that can be questioned, if not criticized, but given the limited resources 
and time frame under which the commission operated, the commission performed extremely 
well.
123
  
 
The claims commission concluded that a large-scale, transborder military operation constituted a 
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, a finding that confirms conventional jus ad bellum 
doctrine. Further, the commission made important findings with respect to the law on self-
defense, specifically that: (1) a State may not use armed force to seize disputed territory 
peacefully occupied by another State; (2) a State may not use armed force in response to 
geographically-limited clashes between patrols along an unmarked and disputed border; and (3) a 
State may not use armed force solely in reaction to another State’s declaration that it will act in 
self-defense. Finally, the commission analyzed the conditions under which reparation should be 
provided for a violation of the jus ad bellum, advancing a proximate cause standard as well as 
other standards when calculating compensation for various categories of harm. 
 
The most limiting feature of the claims commission’s findings ultimately may be their 
parsimony; it is not easy to ascertain from the awards the scope and nature of the evidence upon 
which the commission’s conclusions were based, which in turn may cause difficulties for future 
tribunals that attempt to rely upon those conclusions with respect to entirely different fact 
patterns and evidentiary foundations.  
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